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JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Section 78A-4l 03U) (cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court).
ISSUES ON APPEAL

Appellants Utah Alunite Corp. (Utah Alunite) and the Utah School and
Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA) appeal the dismissal of their Petition
seeking judicial review of an order of the State Engineer approving in part an application
to appropriate water filed by the Central Iron County Water Conservancy District (the
District). Appe11ants filed a petition for judicial review of the State Engineer's order
under Utah Code§ 73-3-14(l)(a), which provides, "A person aggrieved by an order of
. the state engineer·ma·y obtain judicial rev_iew·in accordance ~ith Title:63G,'Chapter 4,··
Administrative Procedures Act."
The State Engineer moved to dismiss Appellants' Petition on the bases that
Appellants were not "parties" entitled to seek judicial review and had failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies. The District joined in that motion. The district court
agreed and dismissed the Petition. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I.

Was the district court correct in holding that Appellants, as non-pai1ies to

the State Engineer's informal adjudication of the District's application to appropriate,
could not seek judicial review of the State Engineer's order?
Not preserved for review: The State Engineer and the District argued that

neither Appe11ant was a ~-party" to the informal adjudication of the District's application
and thus could not seek judicial review. (R. 55-57, 78-79, 271-72, 307-11.) Appellants

did not address this issue in their Opp~sition. Rather, they argued that they "clearly are
... aggrieved part[ies]" (R. 92) and should be allowed "to proceed as aggrieved parties
under UAPA" (R. 86). As discussed in Section l(a), this is insufficient to preserve
Appellants' argument that they need only be "persons aggrieved" to seek judicial review
of District's application. (See Appellants' Br. at 11-16.)
Appellants did not provide a statement of grounds for seeking review of this
unpreserved issue.

Standard of Review: If this issue was preserved for appellate review, courts
"review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the
district court's legal conclusions." Mario,:, Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT
50, ,r 12, 267 P.3d 863 (internal quotation marks omitted).

II.

If Appellants· are able to seek judicial review as non-parties, was the district

court correct in refusing to excuse them from the requirement that they exhaust
administrative remedies? (R. 9-10, 95-98, 274-77, 310.)

Standard of Review: Whether the district court properly granted a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, is '·a question of law, [courts] review for correctness, giving no
deference to the decision of the trial court." Gunn v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 2007 UT App
4, 16, I 55 P.3d 113 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

I.
Utah Admin. Code R655-6-l 8(A): "Any party aggrieved by an order of the State
Engineer may obtain judicial review by following the procedures and requirements of
I~

Sections 63G-4-40 I and -402 and 73-3-14 and -15." The full text of Rule 655-6-18 is
provided as Addendum A.
Utah Code§ 73-3-14(l)(a): "A person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer
may obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative
Procedures Act.~' The full text of Utah Code§ 73-3-14 can be found at Addendum B to
Appellants' Brief.
Utah Code § 63G-4-401 ( 1)°: "A party aggri~ved may obtain judicial review of
final agency action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by
statute." The full text of Utah Code§ 63G-4-401 can be -found at Addendum F to
Appellants' Brief.
Utah Admin. Code R655-6-3(F): "'Party' means the Division or other person
· commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all protestants, all persons
permitted by the Presiding Officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons
authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative
proceeding." The full text of Rule 655-6-3 is provided as Addendum B.
Utah Code§ 63G-4-l 03(t): "'Party' means the agency or other person
commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons pennitted by the
presiding officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or
3

agency rule to participate as parties in an adj_udicative proceeding." The full text of Utah
Code § 63G-4- l 03 is provided as Addendum C.
II.

Utah Code§ 63G-4-40 I (2): ''A pmiy may seek judicial review only after
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that: ... (b) the court may
relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all
administrative remedies if: (i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or (ii)
exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion." The full text of Utah Code§ 63G-4-402 can
be found at Addendum F to Appellants' Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

The District agrees with Appellants' description of the nature of the case with one
exception. The district court held that Appellants had failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies. (R. 358-60.) Contrary to Appellants' contention, in doing so,
the district court did consider whether Appellants should be relieved of the exhaustion
requirement. (Id.) Specifically, it noted that SITLA, despite owning the land now
proposed to be pmi of the Blawn Mountain project at the time of the District's
application, chose not to become involved in the infonnal adjudicative proceeding. (R.
359.) It further considered the possibility that Appellants could have later sought to
change the proceedings from informal to formal adjudicative proceedings so that they
could have intervened. (R. 360.)
4

· B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

The District agrees with Appellants' description of the course of proceedings and
disposition below.

C.

Statement of Facts

The District is a water conservancy district fanned in 1997 to provide water to an
area that includes the Cedar Valley, portions of the Beryl/Enterprise area, portions of
Parowan Valley, and portions of the Lower Colorado River Basin. (R. 2.) On October
17, 2006, the District filed three applications to appropriate groundwater: one for Wah
Wah Valley, one for Pine Valley, and one for Hamblin Valley. (R. 4.) It did so to meet
the growing demand for water. While Appellants have repeatedly claimed that the
District's maximu·m ~ater· supply need by 2060 will be I 1A10· acre· feet (AF) of\vater (R.
87), this "fact" is based on what appears to be reliance on and mischaracterization of
outdated planning documents. 1 More current studies reveal a greater need. The District's
application to appropriate water from the Wah Wah Valley {Application) is the subject of
this appeal. In that Application, the District sought to appropriate 12,000 AF of
groundwater annually. (R. 4.)
Approximately 300 people or entities filed protests to the District's Application, as
provided by Utah Code Section 73-3-7. (R. 4, 14-16, 265.) Neither Utah Alunite nor
SITLA was among the protestants. (R. 4.) In July 2010, the State Engineer held a
1

Appellants appear to rely on the 2008 Lake Powell Pipeline Study Water Needs
Assessment. The 11,470 AF figure Appellants take from that document was an estimate
of the amount of water that would be needed from the Lake Powell Pipeline-a project
that is no longer in the District's future-to meet projected 2060 needs, not the total
projected need, which was estimated to be 29,440 AF.
5

hearing on the District's Application. (R. 4.) Not having file_d a protest, neither Utah
Alunite nor SITLA was present at or involved in that hearing.
The following year, in April 2011, Utah Alunite entered into a three-year
exploration agreement with SITLA for a proposed mining development to be located on
SITLA-owned lands within Wah Wah Valley. (R. 6.) SITLA presumably owned this
land long before 2006, when the District filed its Application. (R. 2, 6; see also West
Desert Land Exchange Act, Pub. Law 106-30 I (Oct. 13, 2000).) Notably, neither Utah
Alunite nor SITLA have ever claimed otherwise.
The project contemplated in the 2011 exploration agreement is referred to as the
Blawn Mountain Project (Project). (R. 6.) The Project proposes to mine approximately
11,500 acres for al unite ore to be used in the production of sulphate of potash and
alumina. (Id.) According to the most recent public securities filings of Potash Ridge,
Utah Alunite's parent company, Utah Alunite has no source of income and has yet to
raise sufficient funds ($25 million) to complete the feasibility study for the Project,
without which construction on the Project cannot proceed. (March 5, 2015, Annual
Infonnation Form at 10, 12-·I 3, available at www.sedar.com.) As of December 31, 2014,
Utah Alunite's current liabilities exceeded its cash and cash equivalents, and investors
were given going concern warnings. (Id. at 12-13.)2
2

The District recognizes-that these facts are not in the Record. However, Appellants'
description of the Project, which is based on outdated facts that were presented to the
district court, fails to provide an accurate representation of the Project's current status.
The District offers these additional facts only to place Appellants' statements in context.
The status and merits of the Project are not relevant to the narrow issue before the
Court-whether Appellants can seek judicial review of the District's Application.
6

In connection· with that Project, on August 21, 2012, Appellants jointly filed an
application to appropriate 6,500 AF of groundwater annually from Wah Wah Valley. (R.
7.) The State Engineer held a hearing on Appellants' application in November 2013.
(Id.) As a protestant to Appellants~ application, the District attended and participated in

that hearing. (R. 265.) However, contrary to Appellants' suggestion, the hearing on
Appellants' application did not involve questions regarding the District's earlier-filed
Application, which had already undergone its own hearing. (R. 265-66.) The District did
not bring any of its witnesses or suppmiing documentation to present in defense of its
Application. (Id.) And, during the hearing, there was no discussion of the merits of the
District's Application. (R. 188, 2{j5-66.)
.

.

.

On May 13, 2014, the State Engineer issued an ord~r approving the District's
Application in part, approving diversion of 6,525 AF of groundwater annually from Wah
Wah Valley (Order). (R. 5.) The following day, the State Engineer issued an order
approving Appellants' application for diversion of 6,500 AF of groundwa~er annually for
a fixed twenty-year period, subject to the District's senior right. (R. 7-8.) Following a
request for reconsideration made by Appellants, the State Engineer issued an amended
order extending the fixed period from twenty to thirty years. (R. 8.) Appellants claim
that the State Engineer's orders on the Districf s Application and Appellants' application
leave Utah Alunite without a secure water source for its project. (R. 9-11.) However,
Utah Alunite's parent company, Potash Ridge Corp., has repeatedly represented to the
public that Utah Alunite has ''secured'' water rights that Hmeet[] the water requirements
of the Project." (R. 269, 280; see also R. 284.)
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On July 21, 2014, Appellants _filed a Petition for judicial review, seeking de novo
review of the District's Application. (R. 1-37.) Upon a Motion to Dismiss filed by the
State Engineer, in which the District joined, the district court dismissed Appellants'
petition on the bases that Appellants were not patiies to the informal adjudication of the
District's Application, and thus were not entitled to seek judicial review, and that
Appellants had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.
Appellants did not preserve for appellate review the argument they now raisethat "party'' status is not required in order to seek judicial review of an order of the State
Engineer. Because Appellants undisputedly were riot parties to the informal adjudication ·
of the District's Application, they cannot seek judicial review under Utah Code Section
73-3-14 and Utah's Administrative Procedures Act, Title 63G, Chapter 4, Part 4.
Even if Appellants preserved their argument for appellate review, the district court
was correct in holding that only parties may seek judicial review of an order of the State
Engineer. The Utah Supreme Court has previously interpreted the phrase "person
aggrieved'~ as used in a fonner version of Section 73-3-14 to require pmiicipation in the
adjudicative proceedings. When the legislature enacted Utah's Administrative
Procedures Act in I 987, that Section was amended to explicitly incorporate the
requirements and procedures of Act, which limits the availability of judicial review of
administrative proceedings to "parties." This is reflected in the Administrative Rules
governing judicial review of orders of the State Engineer. Because there is no conflict
8

between Section 73-3-14 and the Administrative Procedures Act, Appellants' statutory
interpretation arguments are inapplicable.

II.
The district court was correct in refusing to excuse Appellants from exhausting
their administrative remedies. Despite having an interest in the land that is to be part of
the Blawn Mountain Project at the time the District filed its Application, SITLA chose
not to participate in the infonnal adjudicative proceedings on that Application. It has
provided no explanation for not having done so. Even setting this initial decision aside,
neither Utah Alunite nor SITLA made any effort to convert the informal adjudicative
proceedings into formal adjudicative proceedings as provided by Utah Code Section

63G-4-202 so that they could intervene in t}?.e proceedings as.provided by Section 63G-4207. They had more than three years to do so after ~ntering into the exploration
agreement for the Project. The Utah Court of Appeals has previously held that the
· availability of this approach constitutes an adequate administrative remedy that must be
pursued.
To the extent Appellants argue they should be relieved of the exhaustion
requirement because they effectively exhausted their administrative remedies through the
proceedings on their own application, the Utah Court of Appeals has rejected a nearly
identical "collateral exhaustion'~ requirement. The proceedings on Appellants'
application did not involve substantive challenges to the District's Application, nor did it
give the District fair notice and an opportunity to be heard in support of its Application.

9

·This is not the unusual case that would wari·ant an exception to the well established rule
that parties must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT
APPELLANTS, AS NON-PARTIES, COULD NOT SEEK JUDICIAL
REVIEW.

A.

Appellants Did Not Preserve the Issue of Whether Only "Parties" May
Seek Judicial Review of an Order of the State Engineer.

Appellants argue for the first time on appeal that "'party" status is not required in
order to be eligible to seek judicial review of an order of the State Engineer. In its
Motion to Dismiss, the State Engineer pointed to Appellants' lack of party status as the
first.re~son supporting dis1:Uissal. Appellants_ ig~ored this argument in their:.R~spons~,
focusing instead on their argument that they had effectively exhausted administrative
remedies. As a result, they have failed to preserve for appellate review the issue of
whether "party" status is required in order to seek judicial review of an order of the State
Engineer under Utah Cod_e Sections 73-3-14, 63G-4-401, and 63G-4-402.
"Utah law requires parties to preserve arguments for appellate review by raising
them first in the forum below .... '' Columbia HCA v. Labor Comm 'n, 2011 UT App
210, iI 6, 258 P.3d 640. Accordingly, Utah appellate courts "nonnally will not consider
arguments on appeal which were not raised before the trial comi." Olson v. Park-CraigOlson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah Ct. App. 1991 ); see also Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009
UT 3 7, iI 34, 212 P .3d 535 ("[W]e do not address arguments brought for the first time on
appeal unless the [district] com1 committed plain error or exceptional circumstances

10

.&I

exist." (internal quotation marks omitted, second alteration in original)); Busch Corp. v.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P .2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987) ("Generally, when an
argument has not been made in the trial court, we will not allow it to be raised on
appeal.").
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must make a timely and specific
objection. Groberg v. Hous. Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67, ,I 19, 68 P.3d 1015.
"The mere mention of an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority does not preserve that issue for appeal.'~ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
~-For an issue to be sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it must at least be raised to a
level of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it." Id. (quotations and
citations omitted}." These standards are not met here.
Rather than arguirig, as they now do, that "party" status is not required, in their
Opposition, Appellants acknowledged that they "were not specifically identified as
parties" (R. 92), but asserted that they should be allowed "to proceed as aggrieved parties
under UAPA" (R. 86) in l.ight of their participation in the·hearing on their own competing
application. In this way, Appellants avoided the "party" issue. The entirety of their
argument even touching on this issue is found in a footnote:
As set forth herein, the State Engineer and CI CWCD argue that neither
UAC nor SITLA was a ··party aggrieved" under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-440 l (l )(a) because neither was a "party" to CICWCD's application. See
State Engineer's Memo. at 3. They do not, however, challenge Petitioners'
status as aggrieved parties on the basis that Petitioners fail to meet
traditional standing requirements. See id. at 2-5; see also Wash. Cnty.
Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, iJ 14, 82 P.3d 1125
(holding party to adjudicative proceeding failed to show particularized
injury and did not have standing). To the contrary, Petitioners are clearly an
11

aggrieved party because the CICWCD Order prevents Petitioners from
obtaining the secure water rights necessary to proceed with the Blawn
Mountain Project.
(R. 92.)
Even within this argument, Appellants appear to accept the proposition that
"party" status is required. They argued that they "are clearly ... aggrieved part[ies]"
(id.), not that "party" status is not required. Appellants simply did not argue, as they now

do, that because Utah Code Section 73-3-14( I )(a) allows a "person aggrieved" to seek
judicial review of an order of the State Engineer, the '~party" requirement found in
Sections 63-4-40 I and -402 and Administrative Rule 655-6-18 does not apply.
Allowing Appe.llants to challenge for the first time on appeal that "party" status is
required for judicial review would undermine the "two primary considerations underlying
the [preservation] rule" identified by thG Utah Supreme Court: judicial economy and
fairness. Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, iJ 15, 266 P.3d 828. The requirement that
"a party ... raise an issue or argument in the trial court" promotes judicial economy by
"giv[ing] the trial court an opportunity_to address the claimed error, and if appropriate,
correct it," "avoiding unnecessary appeals and retrials." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because Appellants did not address the State Engineer's argument that .only
parties can seek judicial review, the district couti did not have an opportunity to consider
the statutory interpretation Appellants now advance on appeal.
The lack of opportunity for the district court to consider Appellants' arguments is
closely tied to the second consideration underlying the preservation rule-fairness. As
the Utah Supreme Court has explained, "[i]t generally would be unfair to reverse a
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district court for a reason presented first on appeal." Id. '"Under our adversary system,
the responsibility for detecting error is on the party asserting it, not on the court." Id.
·'Notions of fairness therefore dictate that a party should be given an opportunity to
address the alleged en-or in the trial comi. '~ Id. ··Having been given such a chance, the
party opposing a claim of en-or might have countered the argument, potentially avoiding
the time and expense of appeal." Id.
It would be unfair both to the district court and the District and the State Engineer
to allow Appellants to advance their arguments that '"pai1y" status is not required for the
first time on appeal. Had Appellants raised these arguments in their Opposition, the
District and the State Engineer wo~ld have had an opportunity to address them in their
Replies. The district court ~hus would have had the opportunity to decide the issue in
light of competing interpretations. Notably, the District pointed out in its Reply that
Appellants had "ignore[d] the argument contained in the State Engineer's Memorandum
in Support that because [Appellants] were not parties to the informal adjudication of [the
District's] application, they are not entitled to seek judicial review." (R. 271.) The State
Engineer similarly noted Appellants' lack of argument on the issue. (R. 307 (describing
Appellants' focus on "'a factually-based theory of [their] own creation" as "an effort to
air-brush out of the picture their lack of pai1y status").) Despite this, Appellants did not
seek leave to file a sur-reply to address the issue.
When a party ignores an issue in this fashion in the district court, Utah appellate
courts have routinely refused to consider arguments addressing the issue raised for the
first time on appeal. See, e.g., Busch Corp., 743 P.2d at 1219 (refusing to consider
13

C;
~

arguments in opposition to a motion for summary judg1~ent on appeal where the
plaintiffs "apparently chose below not to oppose [the] motion for summary judgment");

Fowler v. Teynor, 2014 UT App 66,

~

22, 323 P.3d 594, 599, reh 'g denied (May 8,

2014), cert. denied, 333 P.3d 365 (Utah 2014) ('~This theory was not asserted in either the
Second Amended Complaint or in [the plaintiffs] memorandum in opposition to the
summary judgment motion. Because this theory was not raised below, we do not
consider it here."); Jensen v. Skypark Landowners Ass 'n, 2013 UT App 48, 15, 299 P.3d
609 (refusing to consider the appellant's argument that "the motion for summary
judgment did not comply with rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure" because that
argument was not ra~sed in respons~ to the motion)~ The Court should do the same here. 3
Be.cause Appellants did not p~eserve their argument that "party" status is not
required in order to seek judicial review, ·and Appellants undisputedly were.not parties to
the informal adjudication of the District's Application, the district court properly
dismissed Appellants' petition. The Court need not reach the issue of whether the district
court was correct in refusing to excuse Appellants from the exhaustion requirement.

3

Appellants claim that the issue was preserved. (Appellants' Br. at 2.) They thus did not
argue that exceptional circumstances warrant consideration of their unpreserved
argument or that the district court committed plain error. See Patterson, 200 I UT 68, ~
13 (identifying these as two exceptions to the rule that the Court will not consider
unpreserved arguments). Appellants cannot now do so in their Reply. Allen v. Friel,
2008 UT 56, 18, 194 P.3d 903 ("If new issues could be raised in a reply brief, the
appellee would have no opportunity to respond to those arguments. It is well settled that
issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were not presented in the opening brief
are considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate court." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
14
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B.

As Non-Parties, AppelJants Are Not Entitled to Seek Judicial R~view.

Even if the Court is willing to consider Appellants' newly-raised argument that
"party" status is not required, the district couti c01Tectly held that only paiiies can seek
judicial review of an order of the State Engineer.
Utah Code Section 73-3-14( I) authorizes a ''person aggrieved by an order of the
state engineer" to "obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act." Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(l)(a) (emphasis added).

Section 63G-4-401, in turn, provides, .. A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of
final agency action." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-40 I ( 1) (emphasis added). Consistent
with the party requirement contained in Section 63G-4-401, Administrative Rule_ 655-6. 18, which governs judicial review o(informal proceedings before the Divfsion of Water
Rights, provides, "Any party aggrieved by an order of the State Engineer may obtain
judicial review by following the procedures and requirements of Sections 63G-4-401 ·and
-402 and 73-3-14 and-15." Admin. Code R655-6-18(A) (emphasis added). Thus, under
the plain language of the governing statutes and rules, party status is required in order to
.seek judicial review of an order of the State Engineer.
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has previously rejected an argument nearly
identical to the one that Appellants now raise: that the use of the phrase "person
aggrieved" in Section 73-1-14( I) does not require prior participation in the administrative
process-in other words, aparti~ status. S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, I 087
(Utah 1990). There, the plaintiff sought judicial review of an order of the State Engineer
approving a change application, although it had not participated in the administrative
15

proceedings before the State Engineer. The plaintiff argued "that substantial econo~nic
rights were affected by the administrative decision, making [it] a 'person aggrieved' and
entitled to judicial review under Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-14 ( 1980)." Id. at I 086. It
fmiher claimed that "section 73-3-14 did not impose a requirement of prior participation
in the administrative process" as "[t]he statute authorizes judicial review for 'any person
aggrieved by [the state engineer's] decision."' Id. (first set of internal quotation marks
omitted). The Utah Supreme Court flatly rejected this interpretation:
This interpretation ignores policy considerations which apply to all
administrative decision making. A requirement of patiicipation at agency
level ensures that those who have an interest wiII bring to the agency's
attention all relevant facts and considerations at the time the agency makes
its decision. Mor.eover, the requirement of [participation] gives the agency
a:nd the other participants notice of the ·identity and concern of interested
parties. These observations, although made in the context of a statutory
requirement of party status, are applicable to any administrative decision in
which interested parties have the right to participate. The require~ent of
participation .as a prerequisite to standing to appeal is a corollary of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is well settled under
this doctrine that persons aggrieved by dec~sions of administrative agencies
may not, by refusing or neglecting to submit issues offact to such agencies,
by-pass them, and call upon the courts to determine . . . matters properly
determinable originally by such agencies.
Id. at 1087 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis added).

Although the version of Section 73-3-14( I) at issue in S&C contained no "party"
requirement, the Utah Supreme Comi neve11heless interpreted ·'person aggrieved" to
require participation in the administrative proceeding-i.e. ''paiiy" status. Notably, the
version of Section 73-3- 14( 1) at issue in S&C made no mention of or cross-reference to
Utah's Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), as that Act had not yet been enacted.
When the legislature enacted UAPA in I 987, it amended, as part of that enactment,
16

Section 73-3-14(l)(a) to provide, "Any person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer
may obtain judicial review by following the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b,
Title 63.'~ 4 1987 Utah Laws 971, ch. 160, § 295 (emphasis added). In doing so, the
legislature incorporated the '"pmiy'~ status and exhaustion requirements found in UAP A
into Section 73-3-14(1 ). 5 Consistent with this amendment, the Administrative Rule
governing judicial review of orders of the State Engineer was amended, changing those
entitled to seek judicial review from a "'person aggrieved" to a "party aggrieved," and
requiring compliance with the procedures and requirements of UAP A. Compare Utah
Admin. Code R655-2-9.3 (governing proceedings commenced prior to January 1, 1988)
("Any person aggrieved by a decision of the State Engineer may, within 60 days after
notice thereof, bring a civil action in the district court for a plenary review· thereof in
accordance with Sections 73-3-14 and -15.") with R655-6-18(A) (governing informal
adjudicative proceedings commenced on or after January 1, 1988) ("Any party aggrieved
by an order of the State Engineer may obtain judicial review by following the procedures
and requirements of Sections 63G-4-401 and -402 and 73-3-14 and-15."). Under the
Utah Supreme Court's holding in S&G, however, the statutory incorporation ofUAPA's
requirements and the amendment to the Administrative Code were unnecessary because

4

In 2008, additional amendments were made to Section 73-3-14. As part of the
"'technical changes" to that Section, the phrase ·'by following the procedures and
requirements of~ in Subsection ( 1)(a) was replaced with •"in accordance with," referring
to UAPA.
5

Section 54-7-15, at issue in In re Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, 175 P.3d 545, which
Appellants' cite in support of their argument (Appellants' Br. at 15), contains no such
incorporation of the requirements of UAP A.
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even wit?out them; only those who had participated in the administrative proceedings·
could seek judicial review as a "person aggrieved."
Given that the Utah Supreme Court effectively required ''pai1y" status even before
the requirements of UAP A were incorporated into Section 73-3-14( I) and the pe11inent
Administrative Rule was amended to explicitly require ''party" status, there is nothing to
support a contrary interpretation with those provisions now in place. Indeed, the Utah
Supreme Court h.as continued to recognize that UAPA 's pai1y status and exhaustion
requirements apply to judicial review actions brought under Section 73-3-14(1 ). In

Taylor-West Weber Water Improvement District v. Olds, 2009 UT 86,224 P.3d 709, the
Utah Supreme Court distinguished between those who initiate judicial review
proceedings from an order of the State Engineer and must "satisfy the requirements for
party status under UAP A," and those who merely seek to intervene in ~uch proc~edings
and need not, as a condition to intervention, satisfy those requirements. Id.

,r,r 7-8.

The

Court would have had no need to address whether someone seeking to intervene in a
judicial review proceeding of an order of the State Engineer must be a "party" and have
exhausted administrative remedies if there was no such requirement under Section 73-314( I) in the first place.
In addition to being unpreserved, Appellants' statutory interpretation argument in
suppmi of a contrary view lacks merit. Section 63G-4-l 02(1) forecloses the possibility
that Section 73-3-14(1 )(a) could alter UAPA 's requirement of party status. That section
provides that the provisions of UAP A "apply to every agency of the state and govern ...
judicial review of [state agency] action" unless "othe1wise provided by a statute
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superseding provisions of [Title 63G, Chapter 4] by explicit reference to this chapter."
Nothing in Section 73-3-14(l)(a) purports to supersede UAPA or its requirement of party
status. To the contrary, Section 73-3-14( 1)(a) explicitly incorporates the procedures and
requirements of UAPA. This stands in contrast to Section 73-3-14(7), which supersedes
Sections 63G-4-401 (3 )(b) and -402(2)( a)(iv) by making "explicit reference" to those
Sections. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14(7) ("A person who files a petition for judicial
review is not required to: (a) notwithstanding Subsection 63G-4-401(3)(b), name a
respondent that is not required by this section; and (b) notwithstanding Subsection 63G4-402(2)( a)(iv ), identify all parties to the adjudicative proceeding.). Where the
legislature wanted to supersede portions of UAP A for judicial review of orders of the
State Engineer, it clearly knew how to do so. It did not do so in co~ection with UAPA's
requirement that a person seeking judicial review must have been_ a party to the
administrative adjudication.
Despite the clear pronouncement that UAP A applies to judicial review of state
agency action unless a separate statute supersedes provisions of UAP A by explicit
reference, Appellants rely on the general principle that when statutes conflict, "the more ·
specific provision will prevail over the more general provision.'~ Williams v. Pub. Serv.

Comm 'n of Utah, 754 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988). This principle ignores the mandate of
Section 63G-4-l 02(1 ). Even setting that issue aside, the principle is further inapplicable
here, as there is no conflict between Section 73-3-14 and Section 63G-4-401. As
discussed above, the legislature amended Section 73-3-14(1 )(a) to require that any
"person aggrieved" seeking judicial review of an order of the State Engineer satisfy the
19

requirements and procedures of UAP A. This includes party status. And, even in the
absence of the specific reference to and incorporation of UAPA' s requirement, the Utah
Supreme Court has interpreted Hperson aggrieved," as used in Section 73-3-14(1 ), to
require pai1icipation in the adjudicative proceeding before the State Engineer. There is,
therefore, no conflict between Sections 73-3-14 and 63G-4-401. The absence of such
conflict is highlighted by Administrative Rule 655-6-l 8(A), enacted after the 1987
enactment ofUAPA and accompanying amendment to Section 73-3-14(1), which miITors
the language of Section 63G-4-401 (I).
This stands in contrast to the two cases Appellants rely on. They first contend that
"UAPA's relation to Section 73-3-14 is no different" from Utah's Administrative
Rulemaking Act's relation to Utah Code Section 54-7-15, which governs judicial review
of the Public Service Commission's rulemaking proceedings. In Williams, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the more specific provision in the Public Utilities Act governed
over the ~ore general provision in the Administrative Rulemaking Act.' There, however,
the two provisions at issue "contemplate[ d] different pr0t~edures for review": the Public
Utilities Act requires that a party seeking review of a Commission order or decision to
file a petition for rehearing prior to seeking judicial review, while the Administrative
Rulemaking Act provides that a declaratory judgment action may be brought to determine
the validity of a rule promulgated by a state agency. Williams, 754 P.3d at 48. The
provisions were in direct conflict with one another. As a result, the Court held that the
more specific provision contained in Title 54 superseded the provision of the
Administrative Rulemaking Act. Notably, the only reference to the Administrative
20

Rulemaking Act found in the Public Service Commission Act did ''not mandate use of the
Administrative Rulemaking Act for purposes of reviewing rules." Id. (emphasis added).
This is vastly different from Section 73-3-14(1 ), which incorporates UAPA 's
requirements and procedures for judicial review of an order of the State Engineer.
Appellants additionally rely on Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Board of
State Lands & Forestry of State, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992). That case, however,
involved statutes that conflicted to an even greater degree than in Williams. Two
provisions were at issue. The first, Section 63-46b-l (2)(g), provided that UAPA does not
apply to state agency actions relating to contracts for the purchase or sale of real property
or judicial review of such actions. The second, a provision in the title governing· act~ons
.

.

of the Board and Division of State Lands and Forestry, provided that judicial review of
'),
\(!p

final Board action shall be governed _by Chapter 46b, Title 63, the then-current version of
UAPA. Relying on the principle that where statutes conflict, the specific governs the
general, t~e Utah Supreme Court held that despite the exclusion in Section 63-46b- l,
UAPA governed the judicial rev~ew of agency proceedings of the Board or Division of
State Lands and Forestry involving the purchase or sale of real property. Again, the type
of direct conflict at issue in SUWA is not present here.
Section 73-3-14( 1) incorporates the party status requirement found in Section
63G-4-40 I (I). This requirement is reiterated in the Administrative Rule governing
judicial review of an order of the State Engineer. Utah Admin. Code R655-6- I 8(A).
"Party" is defined in those Rules as "the Division [of Water Rights] or other person
commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all protestants, all persons
21

· pennitted by the Presiding Officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons
authorized by statute or agency rule to pa11icipate as parties in an adjudicative
proceeding." Utah Admin. Code R655-6-3(F). This definition of '"party" is similar to
that found in UAPA: '''Party' means the agency or other person commencing an
adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer to
intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency mle to
participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-l 03(f).
Appellants undisputedly do not meet either definition. The district com1 was accordingly
correct in holding that Appellants, as non-pa11ies, were not entitled to seek judicial
review of the State Engineer's order on the District's Application.
II.

IF APPEiLANTS, AS NON-PARTIES, ARE ENTITLED TO SEEK
JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
EXCUSE APELLANTS FROM THE REQUIREMENT THAT THEY
EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
"A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative

remedies available." Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-40 I. HThe basic purpose underlying the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is to allow an administrative agency to
perform functions within its special competence-to make a factual record, to apply its
expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies." Republic

Outdoor Adver., LC v. Utah Dep 't of Transp., 2011 UT App 198, il 15, 258 P .3d 619
(internal quotation marks omitted). "And so, as a general rule, parties must exhaust
applicable administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review.'~ Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). "Thus, a district court has jurisdiction to review an
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administrative decision only if the parties have exhausted all available administrative
remedies." Id.
On appeal, Appellants appear to concede that they did not exhaust their
administrative remedies, as they did not participate in the infonnal adjudication of the
District's Application. (See Appellants~ Br. at 16.) They instead argue that the district
court erred by not considering whether they should be excused from the exhaustion
requirement. The district court did, however, consider Appellants' arguments on this
issue. (R. 358-60.) It properly refused to excuse Appellants from the exhaustion
requirement.
Under UAPA, a "court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the
requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: (i) the administrative
remedies are inadequate; or (ii) exhaustion of rem~dies would result in irreparable harm
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring .exhaustion." Utah Code
Ann.§ 63G-4-401 (emphasis added). "However, exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement only exist in unusual circumstances where it appears that there is a
likelihood that some oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would be
unconscionable not to review the al1eged grievance or where it appears that exhaustion
would serve no useful purpose." Republic Outdoor Adver., LC v. Utah Dep't ofTransp.,
2011 UT App 198, 133, 258 P.3d 619.
As an initial matter, it is questionable whether non-parties such as Appellants can
rely on the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement found in Section 63G-4-401, which
refers to a "party seeking judicial review." Appellants have not identified, nor has the
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District been able to find, a single case in which Utah_ Comis have allowed a non-party to
seek judicial review despite the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Even if the
exceptions in Section 63G-4-401 can be considered to apply to non-paiiies, the district
court properly refused to apply those exceptions to relieve Appellants of their exhaustion
requirement.
Appellants contend that the relevant administrative remedies are inadequate.
"[T]he guiding inquiry for adequacy of the remedy is whether the party can be made
whole by the administrative remedies available." Ramsay v. Kane Cnzy. Human Res.

Special Serv. Dist., 2014 UT 5, il 15, 322 P.3d 1163. Appellants do not challenge the
adequacy of the available administrative remedies generally, but rather argue that they
are inadequate because of the timing of the District's Application and the State
Engineer's Order on that Application. They claim that the "delay prevented UAC and
SITLA from protesting CICWCD's application ip 2006" and "prevented UAC and
SITLA from participating in the hearing in July 201 0." {Appellants' Br. at 18.)
Appellants should not be heard to complain that they have been prejudiced by a "delay"
in the State Engineer's approval of the District's Application. Had the State Engineer
acted timely on the District's Application, Appellants would have had no recourse to
challenge that order.
Further, as the district comi concluded, the relevant administrative remedies are
adequate-Appellants simply failed to take advantage of them. With respect to SITLA,
there was nothing to prevent it from filing a protest to the District's Application and
participating in the July 20 IO hearing. Having chosen not to participate in the
24

adjudicative proceedings, SITLA should not now be relieved of the exhaustion
6

requirement and allowed to seek judicial review. See S&G, 797 P.2d at 1088 (holding
'"S&G lacks standing to appeal because it waived its right to participate at the appellate
level by its intentional inaction at the administrative level'} And, as the district court
explained, because Utah Alunite "gets its ability to appropriate water through its lease
with SITLA," "it is stuck with the land owner's actions." (R. 359.)
Even setting aside SITLA' s initial decision to not participate in the adjudicative
proceedings on the District's Application, Appellants could have later attempted to
intervene in those proceedings by seeking to change the proc~edings from informal to
formal. Utah Code Ann.§§ 630-4-202(3), -207. Utah Code Section.63O-4-202(3)
allows this conversion to take place any time before a final order is issued. It places no
restrictions on who may request the conversion. Once the proceedings are converted to
formal proceedings, Section 630-4-207 establishes a procedure by which any non-party
may seek to intervene in the proceedings. This approach was available to Appellants.

6

Appellants do not directly address the fact that nothing prevented SITLA from
participating in the informal adjudication of the District's Application from the
beginning. Rather, they point to the absence of any -~factual allegations in the record
regarding what interest UAC or SITLA may have had in the Wah Wah Valley's
unappropriated water before November 2006 or July 20 IO.'' (Appellants' Br. at 7 n.2;
see also id. at 21.) To the extent this statement is intended to question the district court's
reliance on the fact that SITLA owned the land to be used for the Blawn Mountain
Project at the time of the District's Application (see R. 359), any such effort is
disingenuous. Any land that is proposed to be part of the Blawn Mountain Project that
SITLA did not already own was acquired in 200 I through the West Desert Land
Exchange. West Desert Land Exchange Act, Pub. Law 106-301 (Oct. 13, 2000).
Notably, SITLA has never claimed they did not own the land that is proposed to be part
of the Blawn Mountain Project in 2006.
25

Indeed, the Utah Com1 of Appeals has recognized this approach and held that it
constitutes an adequate administrative remedy. Republic Outdoor Adver., 2011 UT App
198, iiiI 18, 23-24. This is true even if Appellants' efforts might l_1ave been unsuccessful. 7
As the Comi of Appeals explained in Republic Outdoor Advertising, the fact that a
request to convert proceedings from informal to fonnal "is within the discretion of the
presiding officer" and may be denied, does not excuse a person seeking judicial review
from requesting conversion: ''The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted
... is not so easily defeated. If an avenue of administrative relief is available, it cannot
be ignored simply because it might ultimately be unsuccessful." Id.

iI 20 n.9. Appellants

here simply made no effort to intervene in the adjudicative proceedings on the District's_
Application. Their failure to do so does not make an adequate administrative remedy
inadequate. Nor should it allow them to avoid the exhaustion requirement of Section
63G-4-401.
Appellants alternatively argue th~t they should be relieved of the exhaustion
requirement because they effectively exhausted administrative remedies
given that
"the
.
.

7

In a footnote, Appellants appear to argue that the conversion and intervention approach
was not a possibility in this case, and thus the district court should not have considered it.
(Appellants' Br. at 18 n.8.) Their arguments on this point are misplaced. First, although
Administrative Rule 655-6-8 prohibits intervention in informal proceedings before the
State Engineer, no Administrative Rule precludes the State Engineer from converting
informal proceedings to fonnal proceedings as provided by Section 630-4-202. Second,
as mentioned above, nothing in Section 630-4-202 limits who may request that
proceedings be converted from informal to fonnal. Indeed, the Court of Appeals
explained in Republic Outdoor Advertising that the petitioner-a non-party to the
administrative proceedings-"could have requested that the ... permit proceeding be
converted into a fonnal proceeding to allow intervention." 2011 UT App. 198, iI 20.
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{ '
~

State Engineer weighed and decided ClCWCD's and UAC and SITLA's competing
applications for water rights in Wah Wah Valley together.'~ (Appellants~ Br. at 19.) The
Utah Comi of Appeals rejected a nearly identical argument in Republic Outdoor
Advertising. There, the district comi had granted summary judgment to the respondent

on the basis that the petitioner failed to exhaust its administrative remedies with regard to
its challenge to the approval of a competing billboard pennit. The petitioner argued,
among other things, that by "specifically challeng[ing] the validity of [the competing]
permit" in its administrative appeal of the denial of its own permit, it had satisfied its
exhaustion requirement. Id. ,I-21. The Utah Court of Appeals rejected this "collateral
exhaustion'' argument, explaining, "While [the petitioner's] challenge to [the competing]
. permit was an integral part of its challenge to UDOT's denial of its ... permit,
throughout the underlying administrative proceeding, [the plaintiff] attempted to
accomplish these interrelated goals of obtaining its own permit and defeating [the
competing permit] in a proceeding to which [the competing permit holder] was not a
party." Id. ,t 22. "Such a collateral attack on the [competing] pennit did not give [the
competing permit holder] the opportunity to protect its interests or defend against
allegations of wrong-doing and, thus, contravenes due process requirements for
administrative proceedings." Id. ,I 23.
While unlike in Republic Outdoor Advertising, the District was a paiiy to the
infom1al adjudication of Appellants' application, the same concerns that led the Utah
Court of Appeals to reject the "collateral exhaustion'~ argument apply equally in the
present case. Appellants never put the District on notice that they intended to challenge
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the merits of the District's Application during the hearing on their application. Nor is
there anything in the record to suggest that the hearing on Appellants' application
involved such a challenge. And, like in Republic Outdoor Advertising, the District did
not have an opportunity during the hearing on Appellants' application to fully protect its
interests. The District (rightfully) was not given the opportunity to present evidence in
support of its Application and, accordingly, did not have experts present to defend its
Application. Appellants' challenge to the District's Application was limited to the issue
of the relative priority of their application and their argument that their application
represents a more immediate need. This limited, collateral attack on the District's
Application does not satisfy Appellants' exhaustion requirement, nor should it relieve
them of that requirement.
To the extent Appellants' "collateral exhaustion" argument is intended to address
the second statutory exception to the exhaustion requirement, Appellants have failed to
establish that exception applies. While they argue that "the district court should have
considered the irreparable hann caused if exhaustion is required," they offer next to no
·explanation of that alleged harm. (Appellants' Br. at 19.) Their only discussion on
appeal of irreparable hann is found in the following sentence: ·'At stake is the beneficial
use of water in Wah Wah Valley for the next 50 years, which impacts not only the Blawn
Mountain Project but the significant benefits to Utah's public school trust fund and
Beaver County." (Id.) Not only does this fail to identify the in-eparable hann Appellants
maintain would be caused by the requirement that they exhaust their administrative
remedies-as opposed to the merits decision on the District's Application-but it fails to
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take into consideration that Appellants are fully capable of seeking judicial review of
their own application. They have done precisely that. Thus, Appellants have a forum in
which they can raise their argument that their application should be given senior priority
over the District's Application under Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943).
Appellants further have failed to explain how any irreparable harm to them is
disproportionate to the public interest in requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Again, their argument appears to be that exhaustion would have no benefit in this case
because the State Engineer was able to •·fully weigh and consider the application together
with UAC and SITLA's application." (Appellants· Br. at 20.) The Utah Court of
Appeals rejected the nearly identical argument raised in Republic Outdoor Advertising,
explaining that to hold otherwise and "allow [the petitioner] to proceed directly to the
district court ._ .. would permit it to leap-frog over the entire administrative process and
circumvent [the agency's and the opposing party's] opportunities to correct any error they
may have made, a problem compounded by the fact that such a result would countenance
[the petitioner']s attempt to collaterally attack [the other party's] billboard permits
without appropriate notice and opportunity to be heard.'~ Republic Outdoor Adver., 2011
UT App 198, ~ 34 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The same would be
true here.
The district court properly refused to excuse Appellants from the requirement that
they exhaust administrative remedies. This case simply does not present the "'unusual
circumstances" that would warrant application of one of the exceptions to that
requirement. Rather, like in S&G, this case involves a situation in which the party
29

seeking judicial review made no effort to exhaust administrative remedies-either
through SITLA's initial participation in the adjudicative proceedings or through any
effort by Appellants to intervene in the proceedings after Utah Alunite entered into the
exploration agreement with SITLA in 2011, which occurred more than three years before
the State Engineer issued his order on the District's Application.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the District respectfully requests that the Court

Q

affirm the district court's order dismissing Appellant's Petition seeking judicial review of
the State Engineer's Order on the District's Application.

~/4

DATED this /5""' day of April, 2015.

. Draney
Attorneys for Appellee Ce
Water Conservancy Distri t
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Addendum A
Utah Administrative Code Rule 655-6-18

R655-6-18. Judicial Review.
A. Any party aggrieved by an order ·of the State Engineer may obtain judicial review by following the

procedures and requirements of Sections 63G-4-401 and -402 and 73-3-14 and -15.
~

B. The Division may grant a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial
review on its own motion, or upon petition of a party pursuant to the provisions of Section 63G-4-405.

@

@
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AddendumB
Utah Administrative Code Rule 655-6-3

R655-6-3. Definitions.
A. "Adjudicative Proceeding" means a Division action or proceeding that determines the legal rights,
duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more identifiable persons, including all
Division actions to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend the authority, right, or
license; and judicial review of all such actions. Those matters not governed by Title 63G, Chapter 4 shall not
be included vvithin this definition.
B. "Division" means the Division of Water Rights.

C. "State Engineer" is the Director of the Division of Water Rights, which is the agency having general
administrative supervision over the waters of the State. The duties of this Division are primarily set forth in
Title 73, Chapters 1 through 6.
D. "Staff' means the Division of Water Rights staff.
E. "Person" means an individual, group of individuals, partnership, corporation, association, political
subdivision or its units, governmental subdivision or its units, public or private organization or entity of any
character, or'other agency.

F. "Party" means the Division or other person commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents,
all protestants, all persons permitted by the Presiding Officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons
authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding.
G. "Presiding Officer" means the State Engineer, or an individual or body of individuals designated by the
State Engineer, designated by the agency's rules, or designated by statute to conduct a particular
adjudicative proceeding.
~

,.,jp

H. "Respondent" means any person against whom an adjudicative proceeding is initiated, whether by the
Division or any other person.

I. "Application" means any application which has been filed pursuant to Title 73, Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6,
and shall include, but not be limited to, applications enumerated in R655-:-6-5.B.3. An application is also a
request for agency action. The substantive rules governing the filing and perfecting of these documents.are
specified in the above Chapters and in other Division rules, and R655-6 governs only the administrative
procedures for those ~pplications which have been properly· filed.
J. "Applicant" is a person applying for an application.

~

K. "Protestant" means a person who timely protests an application before the State Engineer pursuant to
Section 73-3-7 or who files a protest pursuant to Section 73-3-13.

@
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Addendum C
Utah Code§ 63G-4-103

§ 63G-4•103. Definitions, UT ST§ 63G-4-103

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 63g. General Government
Chapter 4. Administrative Procedures Act (Refs & An nos)
Pari 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 63G-4-103

Formerly cited as UT ST§ 63-46b-2
§ 63G-4-103.

Definitions

Currentness
(I) As used in this chapter:

(a) '"Adjudicative proceeding'' means an agency action or proceeding described in Section 63G-4-102.

(b) "Agency'· means a board, comm1ss10n, department, division, officer, council, office, committee, bureau, or other
administrative unit of this state, including the agency head, agency employees, or other persons acting on behalf of or under
the authority of the agency head, but does not mean the Legislature, the courts, the governor, any political subdivision of the
state, o~ any administrative _unit of a political subdi,vi~ion of the state.

(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body of individuals in whom the ultimate legal authority of the agency is vested
by statute.

(d) '"Declaratory proceeding" ~eans a pr?ceeding authorized and governed by Section 63G-4-503.

(e) "License»means a franchise, permit, certification, approval, registration, charter, or similar form of authorization required

_by statute.

(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons pennitted
by the presiding officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as
panies in an adjudicative proceeding.

(g) "Person·' means an individual, group of individuals, panncrship, corporation, association, political subdivision or its units,
governmental subdivision or its units, public or private organization or enllly of any character, or another agency.

(h)(i) "Presiding officer" means an agency head, or an individual or body of individuals designated by the agency head, by
the agency's rules, or by statute to conduct an adjudicative proceeding.

(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compromised, an agency may substitute one presiding oflicer for another during any
proceeding.

§ 63G-4•103. Definitions, UT ST§ 63G•4•103

(iii) A person who acts as a presiding officer at one phase of a proceeding need not continue as presiding officer through
all phases of a proceeding.

(i) "Respondent" means a person against whom an adjudicative proceeding is initiated, whether by an agency or any other
person.

U) "Superior agency" means an agency required or authorized by law to review the orders of another agency.

(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from designating by rule the names or titles of the agency head or the presiding
otlicers with responsibility for adjudicative proceedings before the agency.

Credits
Laws 2008. c. 382, § 1377. eff May 5, 2008.

Notes of Decisions (2)

U.C.A. 1953 § 63G-4-l03, UT ST§ 63G-4-103_
Current through 2014 General Session.
-~~

End of llorumrnt
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